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Abstract: We develop a product market theory that explains why firms pro-
vide their workers with skills that are suﬃciently general to be potentially useful
for competitors. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest
in industry-specific human capital, then make wage oﬀers for each others’ trained
employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria
with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is
suﬃciently soft and returns to the number of trained workers decrease suﬃciently,
firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would
otherwise suﬀer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to
attract trained workers.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long wondered why firms provide incentives for employees to
invest in productivity-enhancing general human capital that is useful outside
the firm. After all, general training investments make the workers potentially
more valuable for other employers. The famous arguments by Becker (1964)
and Mincer (1974) suggest that, with competitive labor markets, firms have
no incentive to bear the costs of general worker training, as the associated
rents accrue fully to the employees: If training investments are contractible,
workers will obtain the full increase in marginal product resulting from the
investment. However, these predictions seem at odds with reality (Acemoglu
and Pischke 1998, Franz and Soskice 1995, Katz and Ziderman 1990, OECD
1999). In some countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, firms voluntarily
pay for apprenticeships that provide workers with general skills.1 In addition,
firms continually pay for on-the-job training of incumbent workers.2
Similar arguments apply with a vengeance to the case of industry-specific
training, where the skills acquired are valuable for other firms in the same
industry, but not outside of the industry. Even though this case is interme-
diate between specific and fully general training, firms’ incentives to provide
such training would appear to be even lower than for general training. As a
trained worker’s knowledge is only valuable within the same industry, he is
most likely to work for a competitor if he leaves a firm. Thus, not only will
the trained worker be of no value for the original employer, in addition, he
will strengthen the competitor.
Nevertheless, this paper will demonstrate that it is possible to explain
industry-specific training. Our explanation will rely on imperfect competition
1For instance, Bardeleben et al. (1995) calculate the net costs per apprentice per year
in German industry as DM 20509 per year if fixed costs are included, and DM 9194 if they
are not. A considerable part of this training is general - for instance, apprentices spend
about 65 days per year in external schools and courses.
2Several recent empirical studies show that a significant part of the training is not
firm-specific: Baily and Gersbach (1995), Blundell et al. (1996), Goux and Maurin (1997),
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998), Regner (1995, 1997) and Vilhuber (1997, 1998).
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in the product market. We argue in the setting of a three-stage game. In a
first stage (training stage), two initially identical firms decide on how many
workers they want to train. In a second stage (wage-bidding stage), firms
compete through wage oﬀers for the trained workers; workers accept the
better oﬀer. Finally, in the product market stage, firms engage in oligopolistic
product market competition. Training and turnover decisions in the first
two stages determine the distribution of trained workers and thereby product
market profits: We assume that a firm’s gross profits, that is, product-market
profits excluding the costs of training and wages, depend positively on its own
number of trained workers and negatively on the competitor’s, as trained
workers increase productivity, for instance, by reducing marginal costs.
When firms compete for trained workers in the second stage, equilibrium
wages will correspond to the marginal contribution of a trained worker to
gross profits, for a given total supply of workers. This marginal value has
two components. First, an additional worker in the own firm has a direct
positive eﬀect, because it increases the own productivity. Second, the fact
that the competitor does not employ this worker helps to increase profits
because it weakens the competitor.
Our main result is that there often is a symmetric equilibrium with pos-
itive training levels. To see why, suppose all firms train. Consider the in-
centives of a firm to reduce its training activities and poach trained workers
from the competitor instead. A first rough intuition is that the reduction
in the supply of trained workers will result in an increase in wages. Rather
than paying high wages to poach workers, firms might therefore prefer to
train workers to keep the ex-post wages relatively low.
For the intuition described to be correct, however, it is crucial that the
wage, that is, the marginal value of the worker, is indeed a decreasing function
of the number of trained workers in the market. Whether this is so depends
on several factors. First, the training technology is important: Clearly, a
declining wage is more likely the more rapidly the cost eﬀect of employing
additional workers declines. Second, product market characteristics will turn
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out to play a role.
As a result, training will only arise in equilibrium when competition on
product markets is suﬃciently soft, meaning that the profit increase from
becoming more eﬃcient than a competitor is not much higher than the
profit increase when two symmetric firms both reduce their marginal costs by
the same amount. For instance, competition becomes softer when products
are more diﬀerentiated, or when one moves from homogeneous Bertrand to
Cournot competition.
The role of the intensity of competition for training is captured in several
results. For instance, we show that there can be no industry-specific training
with homogeneous price competition. However, in a model of diﬀerentiated
price competition, a large market size or a high extent of product diﬀerenti-
ation strengthen the training equilibria, and quantity competition makes the
equilibrium more likely than price competition.
Therefore cross-sectoral diﬀerences in the intensity of competition may
play a role in explaining diﬀerences in training expenditures.3 Similarly, the
widespread perception that firms have recently become less willing to invest
in training might be the result of increased product market competition.
In this respect, our paper goes beyond existing theory, which assumes per-
fect product market competition and thus cannot use diﬀerent intensities of
product market competition as an explanatory variable.
It is important to emphasize, however that even very soft product market
competition, for instance, product market monopolies for the firms under
consideration are not suﬃcient to guarantee a training equilibrium. In ad-
dition, the training technology must display suﬃciently decreasing returns,
meaning that the cost reduction brought about by an additional trained
worker is decreasing in the number of workers already employed.
3The above-mentioned study by Bardeleben et al. (1995) shows great diﬀerences in
training intensities across diﬀerent sectors. Net variable expenditures per worker and
year diﬀer between DM 1002.- (food industry) and DM 20,565 (chemical industry). In
terms of gross expenditure, the diﬀerences are still large, ranging from DM 12,142.- (road
construction) to DM 32,027 (chemical industry).
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Apart from the training equilibrium, an equilibrium without training may
exist. When no competitor trains, the value of training for an individual firm
may even be negative, so that the firms under consideration would be will-
ing to pay to prevent their workers from training. Intuitively, this is true
because trained workers can threaten to join the competitor, which would
reduce the payoﬀ of the firm that trains compared to a situation where it has
not trained workers. In view of the possible occurrence of multiple equilibria,
we discuss governmental intervention to move firms into the training equi-
librium. This suggests that cross-country diﬀerences in the extent to which
such coordination mechanisms are established might explain the diﬀerences
in general worker training observed in OECD (1999), Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998), Booth and Snower (1996).
Our theory of industry-specific training is obviously related to familiar
explanations of general worker training. Such explanations typically rely on
labor market imperfections caused by asymmetric information.4 Essentially,
if present employers can observe ability or training investments better than
potential future employers, the latter will face a lemon’s problem.5 As a
result, it is diﬃcult for the employee to sell herself on the job market. The
original employer enjoys ex post informational monopsony power, the antic-
ipation of which creates incentives to finance general training. While our
theory of industry-specific training focuses on product market imperfections
and does not involve asymmetric information, it shares the feature of mul-
tiple equilibria with the models of general training that rely on asymmetric
information in the labor market.6
4For a survey of such explanations see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). These authors
also discuss some alternative theories that do not rely on asymmetric information (see also
Stevens (1994), Kessler and Lülfesmann (2000)).
5Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) deal with the case of asymmetric information about
ability; Katz and Ziderman (1990) and Chang and Wang (1996) consider asymmetric
information about training investments.
6See Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1995, 1996), Abe (1994), Prender-
gast (1992), Glaeser (1992), Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
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However, our paper covers new ground in several respects. For instance,
our emphasis on the interactions between labor and product markets not
only allows us to draw a connection between the intensity of competition
and training. In addition, we can show how product market competition
aﬀects wages for trained workers: Essentially, with more intense product
market competition, the workers enjoy greater bargaining power and wages
increase. Thus, we see our contribution not only as another theory of general
worker training, but also as a step towards an integrated analysis of product
and labor markets. In the following, we spell out these arguments in more
detail. In section 2, we introduce the assumptions of our model. In section 3,
we use two very simple examples to show how training levels might depend
on the intensity of competition. Section 4 provides more general results on
the topic. In section 5, we discuss policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The structure of the model is as follows. In period 1, firms i = 1, 2 simulta-
neously choose their human capital investment levels gi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. Think
of gi as the number of its employees receiving training. Training a worker
costs I > 0 for a firm.7 Denote firm i’s trained workers as i1, ..., im, ..., igi . At
the beginning of period 2, firm i can make individual wage oﬀers wi,im(gi , gj)
for each of their own workers and wi,jm(gi , gj) for each of the competitor j’s
worker (j 6= i). In principle, we allow wages to diﬀer even for individuals who
have the same level of human capital or belong to the same firm.8 We nor-
malize wages of non-trained workers to zero. Further, to capture the notion
that human capital is industry-specific, that is, useless outside the industry,
7As the incentive of workers to acquire capital that is not firm-specific is undisputed,
we ignore the possibility of training investments by workers and deliberately assume that
the entire training costs are borne by the firm.
8Here ”wages” should be interpreted broadly, including any type of non-monetary ben-
efits such as pleasant working environments, fringe benefits and flexible working hours
which involve costs for the employer.
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we assume that the wage of the non-trained worker is also the reservation
wage for the trained workers. After having obtained the wage oﬀers, each
employee accepts the higher oﬀer.9 Denote the number of trained workers in
firm i at the end of period 2 as ni. Employing trained workers is beneficial for
the present employer; it could for instance help to reduce production costs,
or to increase demand by improving product quality. This feeds into our
modeling of product market competition in period 3 as follows.
Assumption 1: For each combination (ni, nj) of trained workers, there
exists a unique product market equilibrium with resulting gross product market
profit πi (ni, nj) = π (ni, nj) for firm i. For firms i = 1, 2, πi (ni, nj) is
increasing in ni and decreasing in nj.
Intuitively, the higher the number of trained workers in a firm, the greater
productivity and thus the higher the market profit. The higher the number
of trained workers in the competitor’s firm, the higher the competitor’s pro-
ductivity and thus the lower the own profit.
Assumption 1 contains several implicit statements about the training
technology and product market competition. To start with, note that π
is a function of ni and nj, not of gi and gj. This has two immediate impli-
cations. First, if an employee leaves the firm, the original employer loses all
the benefits generated by the human capital investment - the employee leaves
no traces once he has left the firm.10 Second, training a worker and hiring a
trained worker are perfect substitutes.11 We use perfect substitutability to
express the idea that human capital is not firm-specific, and we shall show
later on that training can nevertheless arise in equilibrium, in spite of this as-
sumption. Finally, note that firms are symmetric in the sense that the profit
9We use a flexible tie-breaking rule: if wi,im = wj,im , whether the employee stays in
his original firm or moves is determined by equilibrium requirements.
10This is compatible with the assumptions in training theories that are based on labor
market imperfections.
11This assumption diﬀers from the training literature which argues that one’s own work-
ers and competitors’ workers are imperfect substitutes, because the ability of the own
worker is better known.
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function π does not depend on i directly, only on the number of trained
workers.
It will sometimes be convenient to assume πi (ni, nj) is defined for arbi-
trary positive numbers, not just for integers: ni /∈ N refers to situations
where at least one worker works part-time. In addition, we shall suppose
that π is diﬀerentiable. We use the following terminology:
• Net product market profits: π (ni, nj)− total wage payments.
• Long-term payoﬀ :
Π
¡
gi, gj
¢
≡ π
¡
ni
¡
gi, gj
¢
, nj
¡
gi, gj
¢¢
− total wage payments− gi · I,
where ni (gi, gj) denotes equilibrium number of workers in the subgame
(gi, gj).12
The game structure is summarized in the Table 1.
Table 1: Game Structure
Period 1: Firms i = 1, 2 choose training levels gi.
Period 2: (i) Firms choose wage oﬀers.
(ii) Workers choose between employers, thus determining the
numbers ni of trained workers.
Period 3: Product market competition results in gross profits πi(ni, nj).
We can treat this game as a two-period game, as all the relevant infor-
mation about period 3 is contained in the reduced form profit πi (ni, nj).
Finally, we impose an assumption on product market competition that is
slightly more restrictive than Assumption 1.
Assumption 2: π (n, n) is increasing in n.
Thus, gross profits increase if, starting from a symmetric situation, both
firms increase the number of workers by the same amount.
12The notation requires that a unique subgame equilibrium exists or that the resulting
net product market profits are independent of the equilibrium.
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3 Motivating Examples
To gain some intuition for the conditions under which training might arise,
we provide two examples which are simplified in two important respects, but
can nevertheless highlight the main ideas of our general approach. First,
training is quite unrealistically described as a (0, 1)-decision, so that each
firm is limited to training one worker at most, that is, gi ∈ {0, 1}.13 Second,
we choose specific numerical values for gross product market profits rather
than allowing for a full-fledged model of oligopolistic competition. The nu-
merical values are consistent with Assumptions 1 and 2, however. In our
first example, they are chosen so as to reflect soft competition; in the second
example, they correspond to intense competition.
3.1 Soft Competition: The Set-Up
Consider the following constellation of gross profits:
• Training decisions gi = 0; i = 1, 2: If both firms do not train, they
share the market at 0.5 units of gross profits each, that is, π (0, 0) = 0.5.
• Training decisions gi = 1 for some firm, gj = 0 for the other firm:
gross profits for the firm that trains are π (1, 0) = 1; gross profits for
the firm without a trained worker are π (0, 1) = 0.2.
• Training decisions gi = 1; i = 1, 2: If both firms enter the product
market stage with one trained worker, profits are π (1, 1) = 0.8.
Finally, as a tie-breaking procedure we assume that the worker stays with
the firm where it was trained when both firms oﬀer the same wage.
The set-up is consistent with Assumption 1: No matter whether the com-
petitor has trained or not, employing a trained worker increases gross profits.
13The only value of hiring a second trained worker is thus that the competitor cannot
take advantage of him. Hence, if one firm employs both trained workers, its payoﬀs are
the same as in the case with one trained worker.
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Similarly, whether the firm employs a trained worker or not, gross profits fall
if the competitor employs a trained worker. Also, Assumption 2 holds: gross
profits are higher when both firms have trained than when neither has. The
set-up reflects soft competition in the sense described in the introduction:
The profit increase from becoming more eﬃcient than the competitor is not
much higher than the profit increase when two symmetric firms both reduce
their marginal costs by the same amount.
3.2 Soft Competition: The Training Equilibrium
With product market competition reduced to simple numerical values, we can
restrict attention to training and wage-setting decisions and solve the game
by backward induction. Intuitively, bidding in the labor market at stage 2
entails wages equal to the minimum of the two firms’ marginal valuations for
a worker.
If only one worker has been trained, the firm that employs him, say firm
1, has profits 1; if he works for the competitor, the gross profit falls to 0.2.
Hence, both firms have a marginal valuation of 0.8 for the worker, so that
the wage, which we denote as w1, is 0.8.14
If both firms have trained one worker, their profits are 0.8; if the competi-
tor were to employ the worker, profits would drop to 0.2. Thus, the marginal
valuation for having one of the workers (rather than none) is 0.6. However,
the marginal valuation for having two workers rather than one is much lower:
Hiring a second worker would increase profits from 0.8 to 1. Hence, denoting
the equilibrium wage oﬀered by both firms to each worker as w2, we obtain
w2 = 0.2 = 1 − 0.8, and both trained workers will stay with their original
firm. Importantly, training therefore not only aﬀects gross profits, but also
wages. When more workers are trained, the wage level is lower. This eﬀect
is important for training to arise in equilibrium.
With the second-period wages determined in this fashion, the game can
be reduced to the simple matrix given in Table 2; where T corresponds to
14In the more general notation of Section 2, this would read w11(1, 0) = w21(1, 0) = 0.8.
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the case that the firm employs a trained worker and NT to the case that he
does not. I corresponds to training costs.
Table 2: Soft Competition Example
T NT
T 0.8− w2 − I, 0.8− w2 − I 1− w1 − I, 0.2
NT 0.2, 1− w1 − I 0.5, 0.5
The first observation confirms the intuition that the provision of industry-
specific training cannot be taken for granted.
Observation 1 An equilibrium without training exists for all I ≥ 0.
Intuitively, if only one firm trains, both firms are worse oﬀ than without
training. Essentially, the worker, who gets w1 = 0.8, extracts the entire
diﬀerence between the gross profits of a firm that has a trained worker and
the profits of a firm that has none. The fact that workers are likely to
leave to the competitor makes firms who provide industry-specific training
particularly vulnerable.
On the other hand, the problem is much less pronounced when both firms
have trained their workers. In fact, a training equilibrium where both firms
train exists if training costs are suﬃciently low.
Observation 2 If I ≤ 0.4, a training equilibrium exists.
The intuition is simple: Suppose one firm trains. Training by the other
firm increases the supply of trained workers and lowers their wages as mar-
ginal profits from hiring more trained workers decline and the bidding game
becomes less fierce. For suﬃciently small training costs, this wage eﬀect
makes training by both firms an equilibrium.
The last observation indicates that it is possible that both firms are better
oﬀ with training than without.
Observation 3 If I ≤ 0.1, long-term payoﬀs of each firm are higher in the
training equilibrium than in the no-training equilibrium.
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3.3 Intense Competition
The preceding example demonstrated that industry-specific training may be
provided in equilibrium provided training costs are low. To show that soft
competition is crucial for training to arise, we consider next an example
that reflects a situation of intense competition in the product market. This
example will also help to dispel the potential misconception that an increasing
number of trained workers necessarily leads to a fall in the wage.
To this end, modify the above example by setting π (gi, gj) = 0 except
when gi = 1 and gj = 0; in which case π (1, 0) = 1 as before. Thus competi-
tion is intense in the Bertrand sense that only firms that are more eﬃcient
than their competitors can obtain positive profits. Table 3 describes the
long-term payoﬀs, which can be understood by analyzing the wage-bidding.
Table 3: Intense Competition Example
T NT
T 1− 2w2 − I,−I 1− w1 − I, 0
NT 0, 1− w1 − I 0, 0
If both firms have trained, the only way to obtain a positive gross profit
of 1 is to poach the other firm’s worker. As a result, the equilibria must be
asymmetric. One firm employs both workers and pays wages that are so high
that it is not better oﬀ than the other. Hence, wages must be w2 = 0.5. As
neither firm can cover its training costs, this cannot be an equilibrium. They
can always obtain zero profits by refraining from training. This illustrates
how intense competition works against training.
If one firm has trained, it would lose 1 unit of gross profit from poaching
by the competitor; and the competitor would win 1 unit Thus, w1 = 1. Note
that, if the competitor trains, gross profits cannot be aﬀected by training.
An asymmetric equilibrium with only one firm training cannot exist either:
If only one firm has trained, both firms value the worker at 1. Hence, w1 = 1,
so that net profits of the firm who trained the worker are 0, and the long-term
12
profits are negative whenever training costs are positive.
3.4 Summary
The examples suggest several conclusions. First, training additional workers
can lead to a fall in wages. Second, when competition is suﬃciently soft, a
training equilibrium may exist. While these examples illustrate the potential
role of the intensity of competition, the ad-hoc payoﬀ structure and the
restriction to one trained worker per firm are unsatisfactory. In the following,
we shall therefore show that the intuition is nevertheless not misleading.
4 Analyzing the General Model
We now return to the more general model of Section 2 where firms can train
arbitrary numbers of workers, and where product market profits result from
more general kinds of oligopolistic interaction. We first show that under an
assumption of “Decreasing Returns to Attracting Workers” each firm will
end up with the same number of workers in the wage-bidding game, up to
integer constraints. We shall then use this result to state conditions under
which equilibria with and without training exist. Finally, we shall give a
detailed interpretation of these conditions.
4.1 The Wage-Bidding Game
We first state conditions under which the wage-bidding game will lead to
an even distribution of educated workers across firms, given that G workers
have been trained in period 1.
Let G = gi + gj = ni + nj denote the total number of trained workers.
Then, to denote the value of an additional trained worker if the own number
of trained workers is ni and the total number is G, we write
v
¡
ni, G
¢
= π
¡
ni + 1, G− ni − 1
¢
− π
¡
ni, G− ni
¢
.
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Note that the marginal valuation v (ni, G) is positive for two reasons. First,
the more trained workers a firm itself employs, the lower its costs and the
higher its gross profits. Second, the smaller the number of players employed
by the competitors, the higher their costs and the higher firm i’s product
market profits.
The following definition will be crucial.
Definition 1 If v (ni, G) is decreasing in ni, we shall say that there are
Decreasing Returns to Attracting Workers (DRAW).
In the Soft Competition Example of Section 2, condition (DRAW) holds:
If both firms have trained, having one worker rather than none is worth 0.6
units, whereas poaching the second worker is worth only 0.2 units. In the
Intense Competition Example, (DRAW) is violated, because if both firms
have trained, only firms that employ both workers have positive profits.
Intuitively, v (ni, G) reflects aspects of technology and product market
competition. Technology determines how large the cost reduction is that
arises from having an additional trained worker. Product market competition
determines how this cost reduction (and the concomitant cost increase of the
competitor) translates into higher profits.
The first main result contains two important conclusions. First, if (DRAW)
holds, wage bidding will be such that workers are split equally across firms.
Second, as argued intuitively in the examples in Section 3, wages correspond
to the firms marginal valuation for attracting another trained worker.
Proposition 1 Suppose that assumptions 1- 2 and (DRAW) hold.
(A) Then the wage-bidding game has an equilibrium such that, up to integer
constraints, both firms employ the same number N of trained workers.15
(B) In this equilibrium, each educated worker obtains wage oﬀers
w∗ (N,G) = v (N,G) .
15When an uneven number of 2N + 1 workers have been trained, one firm trains N
workers, whereas the other firm trains N + 1.
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(C) There is no equilibrium with | nj − ni |> 1.
Proof. See Appendix.16
The intuition for this result is as follows: If (DRAW) holds and workers
are distributed evenly, each firm values an additional worker less than the
competitor values keeping this worker. With an uneven distribution, the firm
with the smaller number of workers is willing to pay more for at least one of
the competitor’s worker than he is prepared to pay for keeping him. Thus,
equilibria must result in an even distribution of workers. Wages correspond to
the value of an additional worker, v (N,G).17,18 Consistent with the examples
of Section 3, wages are therefore highest when it pays a lot to be better than
the competitor, that is, competition is intense.
4.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We now analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game.
Doing this for a discrete number of workers is tedious, as it requires
distinguishing between even and odd numbers. We use a continuous approx-
imation instead. The two main insights of the wage-bidding game analyzed
in section 4.1 are: First, if assumption (DRAW) holds, ni = nj = G/2, up
to integer constraints. Second, the equilibrium wage equals the productivity
16The result in the appendix uses a slightly weaker requirement than (DRAW) which is
useful for the product diﬀerentiation example in section 4.3.
17The same equilibrium obtains in a competitive labor market framework when firms
take wages and demand for trained workers of other firms as given. Therefore, equilibria
with training can occur in a competitive labor market with demand externalities. Details
are available from the authors upon request.
18It is straightforward to show that any other wage profile where everybody is oﬀered
the same wage between v (N − 1, G) and v (N,G) is also an equilibrium with an even dis-
tribution of workers. However, these other equilibria are Pareto-ineﬃcient from the firms’
point of view, since wage costs are higher than in the equilibrium described in Propositon
1. In the following, we assume that the firms achieve an equilibrium distribution of workers
at minimal wage costs, i.e., we use the Pareto criterion among firms as a selection device.
Since firms make wage oﬀers, this assumption is plausible.
15
of the marginal worker, v(ni, G). A natural extension to the continuous case
is to define v(ni, G) ≡ ∂π∂ni −
∂π
∂nj (evaluated at (n
i, G− ni)) and suppose that
the equilibrium wage equals this quantity: v(ni, G) is the marginal value of
poaching an employee for firm i, which consists of the eﬀect of employing
more workers oneself
¡
∂π
∂ni
¢
and of reducing the number of workers employed
by the competitor
¡
− ∂π∂nj
¢
.
Using these two results from the discrete game to approximate the second
period equilibrium in the continuous game, we immediately obtain
Lemma 1 Suppose (DRAW) holds. If firms choose training levels gi and
gj and the second-period training equilibrium is played, firm i’s long-term
payoﬀs in the continuous approximation of the game are
Π
¡
gi,gj
¢
= π
µ
G
2
,
G
2
¶
− G
2
∙
v
µ
G
2
, G
¶¸
− gi · I.
This result implies a simple condition for an equilibrium without training.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (DRAW) holds. An equilibrium without train-
ing exists if and only if
π (g, g)− g · [v (g, 2g)]− π (0, 0)− 2gI ≤ 0 for all g ≥ 0. (1)
Proof. Consider firm 1. By Lemma 1, deviating from (0, 0) to g1 > 0
gives a profit of π
³
g1
2
, g
1
2
´
− g1
2
h
v
³
g1
2
, g1
´i
− g1 · I as compared to π (0, 0)
in equilibrium. With g = g
1
2
, the statement follows.
The proposition clearly shows that intense competition works in favor of
an equilibrium without training. For suﬃciently low investment costs, (1)
will be violated if
π (g, g)− π (0, 0)
g
> v (g, 2g) (2)
for some g > 0, that is, if the average increase in gross profit per addi-
tional worker from a symmetric situation without training to a situation
with training is greater than the wage cost per worker, which is his marginal
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value, starting from symmetry. Thus, if the value of getting ahead of the
competitors, v (g, 2g), is small relative to the average profit eﬀect of each ad-
ditional worker per firm in a symmetric setting, there can be no symmetric
training equilibrium.
Next, we give a condition under which there is an equilibrium with train-
ing, but no equilibrium without training.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (DRAW) holds and (1) is violated. An equilib-
rium with training exists.
Proof. Both players’ payoﬀ functions are continuous. Because product
market profits are bounded above and training costs increase above all bounds
as gi increases, by eliminating dominated strategies, one can assume w.l.o.g.
that strategy spaces are compact. Thus, the game has a pure-strategy equi-
librium. By Proposition 2, this equilibrium must involve training.
The proposition does not necessarily imply that the training equilibrium
is symmetric. Necessary conditions for such a symmetric training equilibrium
are the following.
Proposition 4 Suppose (DRAW) holds. A training equilibrium with gi = g∗
requires:
π (g∗, g∗)− π
µ
g∗
2
,
g∗
2
¶
≥ g∗ · [v (g∗, 2g∗)]− g
∗
2
·
∙
v
µ
g∗
2
, g∗
¶¸
+ g∗I
and
∂π
∂nj
− g
∗
2
·
µ
∂2π
(∂ni)2
− ∂
2π
(∂nj)2
¶
= I, (3)
where all derivatives are evaluated at (ni, nj) = (g∗, g∗).
The first condition merely states that deviating to no training is not
profitable. The second condition follows immediately from the first-order
condition
∂Π
∂gi
=
1
2
∂π
∂ni
+
1
2
∂π
∂nj
−1
2
µ
∂π
∂ni
− ∂π
∂nj
¶
− g
∗
2
µ
∂2π
(∂ni)2
− ∂
2π
(∂nj)2
¶
−I = 0, (4)
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where all derivatives are evaluated at (ni, nj) = (g∗, g∗).
To understand (4), note that the total eﬀect of an additional marginal
trained worker on gross profits thus has the following four components.
(OPE) The own productivity eﬀect
¡
1
2
∂π
∂ni > 0
¢
As workers are distributed equally in the equilibrium of the wage-bidding
game, only half of the marginal increase in the number of trained workers
becomes eﬀective in increasing gross profits for firm i under consideration.
(CPE) The competitor productivity eﬀect
¡
1
2
∂π
∂nj < 0
¢
The second half of the increase in trained labor will end up with the
competitor, leading to a negative eﬀect on one’s own gross product market
profit.
(ATW)Wage payments to additional trained workers
¡
−1
2
¡
∂π
∂ni −
∂π
∂nj
¢
< 0
¢
As half of the additional trained labor is employed by the firm under
consideration, this results in additional wage payments of half the wage rate.
(WTW) Changes in wages per trained worker
³
−g∗
2
·
³
∂2π
(∂ni)2
− ∂2π
(∂nj)2
´´
The sign of WTW is not fully specified by our assumptions. However,
the intuition that additional competition among trained workers drives down
wages typically holds if Condition (DRAW) is satisfied. Appendix 2 contains
a technical discussion of the sign of the wage eﬀect.
The total eﬀect of OPE, CPE and ATW is ∂π∂nj < 0 for marginal changes.
Thus, increasing the number of workers in the market marginally is only
worthwhile if the negative eﬀect (CPE) is outweighed by a suﬃcient reduction
in wages for inframarginal workers (WTW).
Several comments on the training equilibrium are worth making.
First, it is immediately clear that an equilibrium with positive amounts
of training requires that for suitable levels of (gi,gj), a marginal increase
in own training has a positive eﬀect on long-term payoﬀs for player i. In
particular, the increase in gross profits from training (including the negative
eﬀect on competitors) must be at least as large as the increase in wage costs.
This condition is known as the requirement of a compressed wage structure
in models of general training (e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).
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Second, the equal distribution of workers implied by (DRAW) is crucial
for training to exist in equilibrium. Suppose that, as an extreme counterex-
ample, one of the firms attracts all trained workers. Then, there can be no
training: Both firms will have the same net product market profits, which
amount to the gross profits of the firm without trained workers.19 These
profits are smaller than gross profits if neither firm trains. Therefore, in such
cases the training equilibrium cannot exist.
Third, while Proposition 3 gives conditions where only equilibria with
training exist, equilibria with and without training may also exist simultane-
ously. Using Propositions 2 and 4, this would require as a necessary condition
that
π
µ
g∗
2
,
g∗
2
¶
− g
∗
2
v
µ
g∗
2
, g∗
¶
≤ π (0, 0) + g∗I.
Finally, even though we do not explicitly treat the case of more than two
firms, intuition suggests that, for given market size, training is less likely to
arise in equilibrium for large numbers of firms. As argued above, such an
equilibrium necessarily requires a suﬃciently large eﬀect of own training on
wages. When there are many firms, however, the own eﬀect on wages is likely
to be small. Thus, again, it appears likely that increasing product market
competition decreases training incentives.
4.3 Examples
In the following, we consider several examples, strengthening that training
can arise only if competition is suﬃciently soft.
4.3.1 Price Competition with Homogeneous Firms
The first example is a general reformulation of the point from Section 3
that training cannot arise for intense competition. To this end, consider
19If the firm that has no trained workers has lower net profits, it can imitate the firm
that employs the workers by making slightly more attractive wage oﬀers to all of the
workers than the competitor.
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two firms who can potentially train arbitrarily many workers. Suppose they
compete à la Bertrand, that is, they sell homogeneous goods and choose prices
simultaneously. Suppose that marginal costs are a decreasing functions of the
number of trained workers employed in a firm.
Then, as in the intense-competition example in Section 3, if some workers
have been trained, there must be an asymmetric equilibrium of the wage-
bidding game in which both firms obtain the same net profit, namely zero.
Thus, long-term payoﬀs would be negative in any equilibrium with training,
and hence no training is the only equilibrium.
4.3.2 Price Competition with Heterogeneous Firms
As a numerical example, we consider the case of price competition of two
firms producing imperfect substitutes, with demand functions Di (pi, pj) =
A − 10pi + pj, where 0 ≤ A ≤ 30. We specify the training technology as
ci = 2exp (−ni). Thus, marginal costs are ci = 2 without training, and
they decrease exponentially with training. For simplicity, we suppose that
each firm is restricted to training at most gi = 4.15 workers. Using the logic
of Proposition 1, this assumption can be shown to guarantee that workers
are distributed equally in the wage-bidding game. Finally, we set I = 0 to
investigate under which circumstances a training equilibrium would exist for
suﬃciently low training costs. Figure 3 plots equilibrium training levels as
a function of the market size parameter. The outcome is in line with our
general intuition: For low parameter values, no training takes place. Around
A = 12.1, a second equilibrium emerges, with training level gi ≈ 2.45. As A
increases further, training increases further.
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Thus, as greater market size corresponds to softer competition, the idea
that softer competition makes training more likely is confirmed once again.
In terms of economic intuition, there are two reasons why this is so. First,
increasing market size increases the benefits from cost reductions — a standard
scale eﬀect which is familiar from the analysis of cost-reducing innovations.
Second, for a given number of trained workers an increasing market size will
raise the wages for such workers. By training more workers, this wage eﬀect
can be alleviated.20
4.3.3 Monopolies
An interesting polar case is that the two firms are monopolies. Clearly, this
corresponds to very soft competition. Thus, firms interact exclusively by
competing for employees. Gross profits are thus a function of the number
of own trained workers alone. With a slight abuse of notation, we therefore
write the gross profits of a firm employing ni trained workers as π (ni) and
thus v (n,G) = π0 (ni). Condition (DRAW) then requires that the function
π (ni) is concave. Similarly, condition (1) is violated for low I if π (ni) is con-
20Whether wages increase or decrease when market size expands depends on parameters.
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cave. Concavity of the profit function cannot be taken for granted, however.
Suppose for definiteness that firms have linear demand a− p with a > 0 and
constant marginal costs c (ni) which are decreasing in ni. Then the profit
function is convex in c, so that concavity of π requires marginal costs to be
suﬃciently concave in the number of trained workers. This condition must
hold in addition to the requirement of soft competition to guarantee training.
5 Welfare Results and Policy Discussion
Our analysis is partly motivated by diﬀerent institutional arrangements in
labor markets across the OECD. In some countries, such as Germany, firms
oﬀer apprenticeships to their workers. The knowledge acquired in such pro-
grams is mostly general in the sense of being applicable in other firms of the
same industry. Nevertheless, firms bear part of the training costs. In con-
trast, the U.S. economy appears to generate less training that is non-specific
to the firm than Germany or Japan, at least at the initial stage of a worker’s
life (Blinder and Kruger 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).21
For simplicity, we suppose that for each industry under consideration, the
German and the U.S. labor and product markets are completely separated.
Each of the two corresponds to one set of parameters of the game. In terms
of our model, there are thus two diﬀerent types of explanations of the appar-
ent diﬀerences between Germany and the U.S. First, obviously, the relevant
parameters of the game could diﬀer across countries. Roughly speaking, Ger-
many could be in a regime where a training equilibrium exists by Proposition
3, and the U.S. in a regime where it does not. The diﬀerences might come
from industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition. Alterna-
tively, state interventions might have aﬀected the payoﬀ functions. Second,
one could think of the game as being the same in both countries, with both
countries in diﬀerent equilibria. German firms have coordinated on the train-
21Training investment in later stages of a worker’s life is relatively low in Germany
(OECD 1999), but the diﬀerences in the initial stage appear to be more substantial.
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ing equilibrium, while US firms are in the no-training equilibrium.
Regarding welfare, we have already seen in an example that in the pres-
ence of multiple equilibria firms may be worse oﬀ in the training equilibrium
than in the no-training equilibrium. As trained workers and consumers are
better oﬀ when firms invest in training, training in the presence of multi-
ple equilibria is socially desirable if (1) firms benefit from training or (2)
consumers and workers have a suﬃciently large weight in the social welfare
function when firms prefer no training.22
In the former case, no government is necessary if firms coordinate on the
payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium. In the latter case, if firms coordinate on the no-
training equilibrium, there could be a role for government to induce training.
First, government intervention could bring industries into the training equi-
librium. On the one hand, the state can oﬀer complementary investments
such as schooling facilities where costless classroom education is provided.
Moreover, the government can regulate the curricula and demand that ap-
prentices take standardized exams, as in Germany. On the other hand, tem-
porary support for general training investment may establish a social norm
which will remain after direct support has been withdrawn. Apart from
granting direct financial aid, governments could provide such temporary sup-
port by promoting universal acceptance of certificates from apprenticeships.
Which coordination mechanisms might be at work in Germany or in other
countries is beyond the scope of this paper, but the preceding considerations
raise the question of whether complementary activities or temporary support
of the state could be useful to lead firms into the training equilibrium.
Perhaps the most important implication of our model is that increasing
competitive intensity might destroy the training equilibrium. This suggests
that apprenticeships will come under further pressure. More importantly,
another crucial question arises: Can apprenticeships survive as firms are
becoming more and more exposed to competitors from countries without
22In all the examples we have investigated, training is socially desirable when the social
welfare function is the unweighted sum of producer surplus, wages and consumer surplus.
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such programs?
6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we provide a theory of industry-specific training. Our explana-
tion of training does not rely on asymmetric information in the labor market.
Instead, we require imperfect product market competition to generate equi-
libria with general training in a world where turnover is endogenous.
Training equilibria exist for plausible parameter values, possibly together
with the no-training equilibrium. We do not claim that training is likely
in all industries. The most important conditions concern the training tech-
nology and the intensity of product market competition. Competition must
be suﬃciently soft and returns to training must decrease suﬃciently fast for
turnover to be avoided and training to arise in equilibrium. The role of prod-
uct market competition comes from two sources here: a standard scale eﬀect
which is familiar from the analysis of cost-reducing innovations and a wage
eﬀect that is specific to models of training with turnover.
The arguments have been cast in a duopoly framework. They appear
to hold more widely in an oligopolistic framework, but it is important to
investigate how the number of firms in a market aﬀects the likelihood of a
training equilibrium. As discussed in Section 4.2, a plausible conjecture is
that training becomes less likely as the number of firms increases, because
competition becomes more intense. Indeed this is true in the Cournot case
with linear demand.23 For empirical applications we therefore hypothesize
that training tends to be more likely in an industry if (i) concentration is
high or competitive intensity is comparatively low, (ii) returns to training
decrease suﬃciently or (iii) product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently strong.
23Details about such comparative exercises where the number of firms increases with
and without adjustments of the market size are available upon request from the authors.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For existence, we restrict ourselves to the case where G = 2N is even;
the case G = 2N + 1 is similar. We first show that, given the competitor’s
wage oﬀers w∗ (N,G), lowering wages is not profitable. Suppose the firm
reduces its wage oﬀer to k workers (k ≤ N) so that it ends up with only
N − k workers. This deviation is not profitable if
π (N,N)− k · w∗ (N,G) ≥ π (N − k,N + k) .
As w∗ (N,G) = π (N + 1, N − 1)− π (N,N), this is equivalent to:
π (N,N)− π (N − k,N + k) ≥ k (π (N + 1, N − 1)− π (N,N)) ,
which is implied by (DRAW). Thus, downward deviation is not profitable.
As to upward deviations, a higher wage oﬀer for one worker would yield
an increase in gross profits of π (N + 1, N − 1) − π (N,N), which is ex-
actly oﬀset by the additional wage payments w∗ (N,G). By (DRAW), at-
tracting any further worker would yield additional gross profits smaller than
π (N + 1, N − 1)− π (N,N) and thus smaller than the additional wage pay-
ment. Hence, there are no profitable deviations.
To show that there is no equilibrium with ni < nj − 1, note that the
willingness of firm i to pay for an additional worker is
π (ni + 1, G− ni − 1)− π (ni, G− ni), which by (DRAW) is greater than
π (nj, G− nj)− π (nj − 1, G− nj + 1), which is the value of the last worker
that firm j employs
7.2 Appendix 2: The Wage Eﬀect
Proof. We now argue that increasing training levels tend to reduce the wage
level, i.e., ∂
2π
(∂ni)2
− ∂2π
(∂nj)2
< 0. Clearly, this is true if π is concave as a function
of ni and convex as a function of nj. Also, condition (DRAW), i.e., concavity
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of π (n,G− n) as a function of n implies that ∂2π
(∂ni)2
+ ∂
2π
(∂nj)2
− 2 ∂2π∂ni∂nj < 0.
Unless ∂
2π
∂ni∂nj −
∂2π
(∂nj)2
is very positive, therefore, 24
∂2π
(∂ni)2
− ∂
2π
(∂nj)2
=
∂2π
(∂ni)2
+
∂2π
(∂nj)2
− 2 ∂
2π
∂ni∂nj
+ 2
µ
∂2π
∂ni∂nj
− ∂
2π
(∂nj)2
¶
< 0
and (WPTW) is therefore positive.
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